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THE CONGRESS 
IN INDIA- 
CRISIS AND SPLIT 
/ Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 
The University ofTexas at Austin 
n November 1969, the Congress party of India was torn apart after four 
months of inner-party conflict. The truncated leadership of the party or- 
ganization, isolating itself from the will of the majority of the Congress 
Parliamentary Party, expelled Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, daughter of 
Nehru, from the Congress. In the centenary ear of Mahatma Gandhi's birth, 
two Congress parties fought for the tattered standard of the nationalist move- 
ment. 
From the time the Congress first assumed the responsibilities of public 
office, there has been conflict between the governmental nd organizational 
wings of the party. In the early years after independence, as the political 
center of gravity shifted from the party to the Government, Prime Minister 
Nehru battled party presidents, and in 1951 assumed the Congress presi- 
dency himself. To hold the Prime Minister accountable to the party, Nehru 
argued, would reduce parliamentary democracy to a "mockery." The re- 
sponsibility for decision-making lay with the Government. With Nehru's 
decline and death, however, the leadership of the organization, a coterie 
of state bosses called the Syndicate, reasserted itself and, engineering the 
two successions to bring Shastri Lal Bahadur (1964) then Indira Gandhi 
(1965 and 1967) to power, sought to dominate the office of the Prime Minis- 
ter. 
The traditional conflict between the two wings was accentuated by the 
widespread defeats inflicted on the Congress in the 1967 elections and the 
loss of power in half the states. Beyond this, however, increasing political 
consciousness among the mass electorate underscored two basic facts: (1) 
the obsolescense of a Congress political machine which rested on the support 
of wealthy peasants and landowners, and (2) the widening economic dis- 
parities of the nation, reflecting the gap between Congress policy and effec- 
tive implementation. 
In the tension between the Government and the party organization, the 
presidential election in 1969 brought he conflict o the surface and initiated 
the four month crisis that split the 84-year-old Indian National Congress. 
In challenge to the Syndicate, Indira Gandhi sought to securely reestablish 
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the dominance of the Prime Minister within the party, and facing the 1972 
elections, she sought to secure her choice of candidates in nomination and 
to give effective meaning to the Congress commitment tosocialism. 
The first round of battle took place at the meeting of the All-India Con- 
gress Committee at Bangalore in July 1969. To gain initiative at the Banga- 
lore session, Mrs. Gandhi sent a note of "stray thoughts" to the Working 
Committee urging a more aggressive stance toward economic policy-na- 
tionalization of major commercial banks, effective implementation of land 
reforms, ceilings on urban income and property, and curbs on industrial 
monopolies. The Syndicate, ideologically incohesive, was divided in its re- 
action. Conservatives S. K. Patil and Congress President Nijalingappa sided 
with Morarji Desai in opposition; Kamaraj and Home Minister Y. B. Cha- 
van expressed favor. To avoid a split on the eve of the presidential nomina- 
tion, Chavan secured a unanimous resolution calling on the central and 
state governments oimplement the Prime Minister's uggestions. The Syn- 
dicate, however, in alliance with Desai, sought to retain its hold over the 
party and to secure the Congress presidential nomination for its own man, 
Sanjiva Reddy, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, in opposition to Mrs. Gandhi's 
preference for V. V. Giri, the seventy-four year old Acting President who 
took over on the death of President Zakir Hussain earlier in 1969. 
By custom, the nomination is made by the eight-member Central Parlia- 
mentary Board, elected by the All-India Congress Committee. With no chance 
for Giri, Mrs. Gandhi, with the support of Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, Indus- 
tries Development Minister, formally proposed Jagivan Ram, Minister for 
Food and Agriculture. Reddy's nomination, however, was secure with the 
support of Nijalingappa, Kamaraj, Patil, and Desai. Home Minister Chavan 
threw his lot with the majority. With Reddy's nomination by Congress, V. 
V. Giri entered the presidential contest as an independent. He resigned as 
Acting President, and in a vigorous campaign drew the support of the Sam- 
yukta Socialist Party, the regional Dravida Munnetra Kalagam (D.M.K.)- 
the ruling party in Tamilnadu-the Muslim League, the two wings of the 
Communist party, and almost all elements of the United Front governments 
of Kerala and West Bengal. The right wing opposition, the Jana Sangh, 
Swatantra and the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (B.K.D.) of Uttar Pradesh, put 
forward former Finance Minister C. D. Deshmukh as their candidate. The 
Praj a Socialists sat the fence between Giri and Deshmukh. 
Within the Congress, as Chavan sought a rapprochement between the 
Prime Minister and the Syndicate, Mrs. Gandhi relieved Morarji Desai of 
his Finance portfolio, deepening the wedge between the two groups. To 
save his "self-respect," Desai then resigned as Deputy Prime Minister. Al- 
though Mrs. Gandhi claimed to have taken the action because of Desai's 
position on her economic measures, Desai had, if grudgingly, accepted the 
A.I.C.C. resolution. The Syndicate viewed the affair as a vendetta, but as 
sympathy grew for Desai, Mrs. Gandhi retained the initiative. She an- 
nounced the nationalization of fourteen major commercial banks, at once 
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justifying her earlier action and pushing the Desai controversy into the 
background. The purpose of nationalization, she announced, was to pro- 
vide more equitable access to bank credit, particularly for small farmers 
and artisans. Chavan, Kamaraj, and Atulya Ghosh, previous advocates of 
bank nationalization when Mrs. Gandhi seemed uninterested, welcomed the 
decision. The banks, holding some 70% of the country's total bank assets, 
were largely in the hands of a few dominant business families, the Birlas, 
Tatas, Dalmias, and Jains. Nationalization involved the expenditure of 
little political capital and reaped widespread support for the Prime Minister. 
She declared the action as "only the beginning of a bitter struggle between 
the common people and the vested interests in the country." 
Indira Gandhi, though having signed Reddy's nomination papers, had 
yet to come out clearly in favor of the party's conservative nominee. In- 
deed, there was speculation that Reddy would try to use the untested powers 
of the presidency against the Prime Minister, if not to unseat her altogether. 
Where at first Reddy's election seemed assured, with the Congress holding 
52% of the votes, increasing rumors of defections to Giri caused consider- 
able unease among Syndicate members. Within one week of the election, 
party President Nijalingappa issued a whip instructing all Congress mem- 
bers of parliament and the state legislative assemblies to vote for Reddy 
and also asked Mrs. Gandhi to make a statement of support immediately 
for the Congress nominee. The Prime Minister, the leader of the Congress 
Parliamentary Party, refused to issue a whip for Reddy, and her supporters 
called for a "free vote" of conscience in the election. A large number of the 
Congress M.P.s indicated their support of a free vote; some publicly tore 
up the whip notice. Support for Giri was now in the open. 
Fifteen candidates, with three leading contenders, stood for the election, 
held on August 16. As neither Reddy nor Giri achieved the required number 
of votes on the first count, the second preferences indicated on the Desh- 
mukh ballots were then tabulated. On the second count, Giri was declared 
elected. Giri's lead on the first ballot came primarily from the non-Congress 
states of Tamilnadu, Kerala, and West Bengal. On the second count, it was 
the second preference votes of the B.K.D. which gave him the victory, as 
the second preference vote of Deshmukh's Jana Sangh and Swatantra sup- 
porters generally went to Reddy. Violations of the Congress whip-particu- 
larly in Andhra and Uttar Pradesh-were considerable. On the first pref- 
erence vote, two out of five Congress M.P.s and one out of four M.L.A.s 
supported Giri. 
Giri's election was greeted with tremendous popular enthusiasm. In the 
wake of Reddy's defeat, the Syndicate was in disarray. It had been em- 
barrassed and was determined to bring disciplinary action against the Prime 
Minister. With pressure from those states with narrow Congress majorities, 
where a split might put them out of office, and with the mediation of Chavan, 
the Working Committee "closed" the matter with a plea for unity. 
The unity resolution only papered over an almost conspiratorial atmo- 
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sphere on both sides. Moving to give "a more cohesive and purposive di- 
rection" to the work of the Council of Ministers, Mrs. Gandhi requested 
the resignation of four junior ministers who were known to support the 
Syndicate. In heated exchanges with Nijalingappa, Mrs. Gandhi launched 
a signature campaign among the members of the A.I.C.C. to have a new 
Congress President elected by the end of the year. The Prime Minister argued 
that Congress policies cannot be fully implemented unless the party organi- 
zation is fully committed to them. More than four hundred of the seven 
hundred odd elected members of the A.I.C.C. signed the requisition. 
Seeking to cast the inner-party struggle in an ideological mold, Mrs. 
Gandhi had strengthened her hand immeasurably. "Ideological divergences," 
wrote Pran Chopra in The Citizen (August 23, 1969), "offered aid and 
abetment he more they were brought in to conceal ambition; towards the 
end they began to matter more than anything else." The Syndicate is funda- 
mentally non-ideological, but conservative in temper and tied to a base of 
support among landed and big business interests. Indira Gandhi, if com- 
mitted to socialism, is no radical, and among her followers are some of 
highly questionable ideological credentials. The Congress Chief Ministers of 
the states, most of whom are aligned with her) had never been particularly 
anxious to implement a socialist policy of land reform and risk the aliena- 
tion of their landed source of money and votes. Their assessment of Con- 
gress chances in 1972, however, prompted an opening to the left and a 
recognition that long professed Congress policies if left unimplemented 
would leave Congressmen behind at the polls at the next election. 
On October 31, on the night before the scheduled meeting of the Working 
Committee, Nij alingappa announced his decision to drop two of Mrs. 
Gandhi's supporters from the Working Committee. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, 
a nominated member, was charged with anti-party activities and informed 
that he no longer enjoyed the confidence of the Congress President. C. 
Subramaniam, opponent of Kamaraj in Tamilnadu, was told that his mem- 
bership had "lapsed" with his pressured resignation from the presidency 
of the Tamilnad Congress Committee. These actions, designed to ensure the 
Syndicate of a majority in the Working Committee meeting, were met by 
the Prime Minister and her supporters with boycott and a parallel meeting 
at her residence. There, with Home Minister Chavan now firmly with Mrs. 
Gandhi, they resolved to hold a meeting of the A.I.C.C. at Delhi in late 
November to elect a new Congress President. 
With demonstrators outside, the eleven members out of twenty-one who 
attended the regular Working Committee meeting at the A.I.C.C. head- 
quarters declared the requisition illegal. They affirmed their own com- 
mitment o the path of socialism, and accused the Prime Minister of 
attempting "to find in the Congress organization a scapegoat for the 
manifest failures of the administration." Exchanges between the two camps 
continued with increasing vituperation and pettiness. Nijalingappa, pressed 
by Kamaraj and Morarji Desai, accused the Prime Minister of intrigue, 
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indiscipline, and corruption and served a "show cause" notice on her to 
explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against her. Mrs. Gandhi, 
in turn, requested the resignation of the Railway Minister, Dr. Ram Subhag 
Singh, a Syndicate supporter. The Congress Chief Ministers, working to 
save their own governments, attempted various compromise formulas and 
even arranged an abortive luncheon between the two combatants. 
On November 12, the Working Committee xpelled Indira Gandhi from 
the Congress and instructed the Congress Parliamentary Party to elect a 
new leader. The C.P.P., however, has its own constitution, and a motion of 
no-confidence requires a two-thirds majority. Meeting the following day, 
the C.P.P., in an overwhelming majority of its 432 members, reaffirmed 
its support for the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi. Syndicate supporters in 
Parliament boycotted the meeting and met informally at Morarji Desai's 
residence. Meeting again two days later in formal session, one hundred 
and eleven Congress M.P.'s elected Desai as chairman of the Congress Parlia- 
mentary Party in Opposition. Dr. Ram Subhag Singh was elected leader of 
the party in the Lok Sabha, the lower house. With sufficient number in 
the party to gain official recognition (which no party before had ever done), 
Dr. Singh emerged as India's first Leader of the Opposition. Against the 
60 or so Congressmen in opposition in the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister 
held the support of more than two hundred. With the formal split in the 
Congress party, however, the Government of Indira Gandhi no longer com- 
manded an absolute majority in Parliament. While a few Congress rebels 
from earlier days began to return to the party fold, the survival of the 
Government ow depended on support from members of the opposition. 
The Prime Minister weathered her first challenge on the opening day of 
the winter parliamentary session, November 17. On a de facto motion of 
censure for adjournment in the Lok Sabha, a number of independents, 
waverers from various parties, the D.M.K., and the two Communist parties 
stood with the Congress Government. Ranged on the other side were the 
Jana Sangh, Swatantra, the Praja Socialists, the Samyukta Socialists, and 
the Congress Opposition. 
The Congress split was institutionalized in December 1969 with two 
separate Congress essions. The old Congress under Nijalingappa, meeting 
at Ahmedabad, engaged largely in a ritual of attack and self-justification. 
It had, however, attracted a far greater number of delegates than expected. 
The Indira group challenged their claim to a majority of the members and 
questioned the credentials of many delegates. A week later, at Bombay, the 
new Congress met with an equally impressive number of delegates-in turn 
challenged by the Syndicate in what became a meaningless game of numbers. 
Jagjivan Ram, Indira's choice, became the new Congress President, suc- 
ceeding C. Subramaniam, who had served as Acting President during the 
previous weeks. That the new Congress embodied many of the old con- 
tradictions was clear with Subramaniam's interim appointments o fill the 
vacancies on the Working Committee. The ideological conflict between left 
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militants and the centrists, manifest in the controversy surrounding the ap- 
pointments, emerged almost at once in the Bombay session. The economic 
program presented, largely a restatement of past Congress commitments 
with a promise for implementation, caused considerable disappointment 
among the Young Turks in the party who sought a far more radical posture 
for the Congress. Indira Gandhi, for all her efforts, however, remained on 
a political leash which limited the range and freedom of her action. The 
Prime Minister nevertheless now operated from a position of greatly en- 
hanced strength both as leader of her party and, for the time at least, of the 
nation. 
The split in the Congress was mirrored in the contradictions and confusion 
of the parties in the opposition, but the prospects for a general polarization 
in Indian politics are unlikely, for both on the left and on the right, there 
are deep divisions in ideology, temperament, and social base. The Prime 
Minister, to maintain support and to ready herself for forthcoming elec- 
tions, will have to effectively implement he Congress economic program. 
Slogans and rhetoric will no longer suffice. The Government will inevitably 
be drawn further to the left, both to fulfill its own self-image and to meet 
the pressure from its new allies among the opposition. The confidence the 
Prime Minister now commands will be strained increasingly, however, as 
each of the groups sustaining her survival demand a greater role in the 
Government. Although now with a substantial majority, the Prime Minister 
is vulnerable to political blackmail, as any one of the elements can threaten 
to withdraw support and potentially defeat the Government. Mrs. Gandhi 
can only go so far without losing the base of support within her own party. 
At a point where the Prime Minister is unable or unwilling to yield to 
outside pressure, she might then dissolve the Lok Sabha, and in parliamen- 
tary mid-term elections eek a mandate from the people in the form of an 
absolute majority in her own right. In order to gain control of the Con- 
gress organization in the states, or to establish alternative structure where 
necessary, Mrs. Gandhi will likely postpone elections as long as possible, 
perhaps until the general elections of 1972. She now rides a crest of popular 
support, however, and would be at a tactical advantage in holding parliamen- 
tary elections eparately from the general elections, where the contests for 
the state assemblies would challenge the Prime Minister's earch for a stable 
Congress majority at the Center with distracting local issues. 
The instability and pattern of defections which have characterized politics 
at the state level since 1967 might well rise to the top. In the form of the 
French Fourth Republic, political immobilisme might shift responsibility of 
government from popularly-elected representatives to bureaucratic civil 
servants. Presidential intervention becomes a serious possibility at the Center 
and the position of the military more critical. The events of 1969 open a 
new era in Indian politics. The fragile unity of the Congress is broken, 
but unless short-term stability itself becomes the highest value, the unity 
of a party in inaction and in sustenance of the vested interests of the status 
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quo is unlikely to yield popular support. Tle system of one-party dominance 
in India has come to an end, and if the political horizon affords a prospect 
of unstable coalition government, both in the states and at the Center, it 
brings with this threat also the possibility of government more genuinely 
responsive to the people. 
ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR. is an Associate Professor of Government a the Uni- 
versity of Texas at Austin. 
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